







Mutual and Solidary Incorporation as 
elementary forms of Social cognition
Abstract
In this paper, I investigate the bodily dimension of elementary forms of social cognition. 
I argue that the discussions on participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation as 
its phenomenologically accessible dimension can provide valuable conceptual tools ac-
counting for a pre-reflective, bodily-organised sense of having to do with another subject. 
I also argue, however, that the bodily sense of sharedness intended in these discussions is 
less informative concerning recent findings from the discussion on collective intentionality. 
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The	upshot	of	my	discussion	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	high	potential	 for	applying	
the	 neo-phenomenological	 notions	 of	 mutual incorporation	 and	 solidary 
incorporation	 to	current	discussions	on	social	cognition	and	collective	in-
tentionality.
1. Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation






































































ture	of	unidirectional	 incorporation	 incorporation	 is	 this:	A	person’s	mean-
ingful	engagement	with	her	environment	is	(re-)coordinated	according	to	the	
–	enabling	or	drawing	–	 the	character	of	 incorporated	object.	Participatory	
sense-making,	 however,	 is	 dedicated	 to	 specific	 social	meaning	 and,	 thus,	





























































































1.3. Mutual incorporation and collective intentionality










mutual	 incorporation	 is	 a	 central	 factor	 in	establishing	what	Schutz	 (1967,	
164)	calls	the	subject’s	pre-predicative	awareness	of	being	related	to	another	




















The	 comparison	 between	 these	 two	 cases	
should	 of	 course	 not	 blur	 the	 differences	
















of	sharedness.	 In	particular,	 it	 is	about	 the	shared	meaning	 that	emerges	 in	
the	relevant	interaction	processes	in	which	the	individuals	participate	(cf.	De	





sense-making	activity	becomes	a	 shared	one’	 (2007,	497).	 In	 short,	 a	 situ-
ation’s	meaning	is	in	some	sense	of	the	word	common	to	both	of	us,	if	that	




It	may	be	worth	noting	here	 that	 a	 similar	 argument	has	been	made	based	
on	other	approaches	within	the	enactivist	camp.	Applying	the	related	notion	
of	mutual	‘entrainment’,	Krueger	(2016,	270f.)	has	suggested	an	account	of	
shared	 grief	 according	 to	 which	 each	 partner’s	 bodily	 expressions	 of	 grief	
(e.g.	the	quiet	heaving,	the	sound	of	weeping)	‘feed	back	onto,	permeate,	and	
modulate’	the	other’s	feeling	state.4	More	generally,	entrainment	as	another	

















situations,	 this	 time	 those	 ones	 that	 had	 been	 perceived	 as	more	 success-
ful:	 In	 contrast	 to	 those	 ‘hard	 nuts	 to	 crack’	 that	were	mentioned	 before,	
another	 group	 of	 interviewees	 was	 described	 as	 meeting	 the	 interviewers	
with	a	‘warm	response’.	These	interviewees	were	establishing	some	sort	of	
‘intimacy’	 that	 seemed	 to	 be	 more	 influential	 to	 the	 further	 course	 of	 the	
interview	than,	for	instance,	the	explicit	realisation	of	existentially	relevant	






















































Stein	 1922,	 169f.	 The	 translation	 is	 taken	




adds,	 that	 this	 ‘shared	 causal	 occurrence’	 is	
only	possible	if	the	individuals	in	question	are	
orientated	to	one	another	in	terms	of	“a	self-




this	 latter	quote,	 however,	 suggests	 that	one	
could	 argue	 with	 and	 beyond	 Stein	 that	 the	
openness	in	question	is	not	entirely	‘mental	in	
nature’,	insofar	as	it	also	involves	both	lived	
bodies	 oscillating	 between	 what	 Fuchs	 and	
De	 Jaegher	 call	 ‘dominance’	 and	 ‘submis-



































on	 the	 rational	 conditions	 of	 public	 reasoning,	 since	 he	 thinks	 that	 such	 a	
project	would	leave	too	many	questions	in	that	matter	unanswered.	In	short,	
Schmitz’s	argument	amounts	 to	 the	claims	 that	 rational	discourses	as	envi-
sioned	by	Habermas	and	Apel	can	only	function	if	they	have	a	basis	in	what	
he	calls	‘communal	situations’	with	an	implicit	core	of	shared	norms	and	that	























same	 distinction	 between	 unidirectional	 and	 mutual	 incorporation	 that	 has	
later	been	suggested	by	Fuchs	and	De	Jaegher.
What	 is	 interesting	with	 regard	 to	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	
however,	 is	 that	Schmitz	 subsumes	unidirectional	 as	well	 as	mutual	 incor-
poration	under	the	category	antagonistische Einleibung	(antagonistic	incor-

















































us	–	the	orchestra’s	members	–	performing	Le Sacre du printemps	(cf.	Schmid	
















(Matthiesen	2006),	 or	 a	 pre-reflective,	 unthematic	 sense	of	 us	 that	 charac-
terises	 experiences	 in	 the	 first	 person	plural	 (Schmid	2005,	 99;	 2013,	 12).	
Benja’s	 smile	 is	 responding	 to	 something	 she	 already	 shares	 with	Antonia	
rather	than	establishing	it.	In	other	words,	Antonia	and	Benja	find	themselves	
in	a	peculiar	communal	situation	that	precedes	their	interaction.	One	of	the	
most	 salient	 factors	 in	 that	 situation	 is	 the	 force	 related	 to	 the	 moment	 of	
inertia	when	the	metro	train	rapidly	speeds	up.	Both	Antonia	and	Benja	feel	













as	an	orchestra	performing	Le Sacre du printemps.	What	all	these	forms	have	
in	common	in	terms	of	solidary	incorporation	is	that	the	lateral	relation	to	the	
others	is	not	only	some	coordinated	behaviour	to	be	observed	from	a	third-
person	perspective	–	 an	 audience	witnessing	Sartre’s	 fighters,	 for	 instance	
–	but	something	 that	 is	also	 tangible	 to	 the	 incorporated	 individuals	 them-
selves.	The	lateral	relation	to	the	others	in	question	is	different	from	relating	
to	the	other	in	mutual	or	unidirectional	incorporation.	The	oboist	performing	
Le Sacre du Printemps	does	not	directly	grasp	or	individuate	the	other	mu-
sicians,	but	 is	 rather	 aware	of	 them	 in	an	undifferentiated,	 ‘pre-numerical’	
manner,	as	Sartre	 (1956,	282)	would	have	called	 it.	 It	 is	 this	awareness	of	
being	laterally	coordinated	with	others	that	constitutes	an	elementary	source	
of	the	sense	of	us	or	being	in	this	together.	Being	not	only	ascertainable	on	






discussion	 on	 collective	 intentionality	 than	 participatory	 sense-making:	 In	
solidary	incorporation,	the	participatory	aspect	is	in	principle	palpable	to	the	
participants	themselves.
2.3. More complex scenarios




































means	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 collective	 intentionality	 (Zahavi	 2014,	
246	ff.).	While	fighting,	Sartre’s	fighters	are	mutually	incorporated,	and	they	
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Zajedničko i solidarno utjelovljenje 
kao osnovni oblici društvene spoznaje
Sažetak
U ovom radu istražujem tjelesnu dimenziju osnovnih oblika društvene spoznaje. Argumentiram 
da rasprave o »participatory sense-making« i zajedničkom utjelovljenju kao fenomenologijski 
dostupnoj dimenziji mogu dati vrijedne koncepcijske alate za predrefleksivan, tjelesno orga-
niziran osjećaj za egzistenciju drugih subjekata. Međutim, isto tako argumentiram da tjelesni 
osjećaj dijeljenja, kako je naznačen tim raspravama, nije dovoljno informativan kada se u obzir 
uzmu nedavni pronalasci u raspravama o »kolektivnoj intencionalnosti«. Prema tome, predla-
žem da se kao alternativa nanovo razmotri pojam »solidarne utjelovljenosti« kako se pojavljuje 





Wechselseitige und solidarische einleibung 
als elementare formen der sozialen Kognition
Zusammenfassung
Mein Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der leiblichen-elementaren Dimension sozialer Wahrneh-
mung. Ich will zeigen, dass die Diskussionen zum „participatory sense-making“ und zur wech-
selseitigen Inkorporation einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis eines präreflexiven, leiblich 
organisierten Sinnes für die Existenz anderer Subjekte leisten. Ich möchte aber auch zeigen, 
dass der leiblich organisierte Sinn der Gemeinsamkeit, der in diesen Diskussionen auch anvi-
siert ist, vor dem Hintergrund der Ergebnisse gegenwärtiger Debatten zum Thema „kollektive 
Intentionalität” zu unbestimmt bleibt. In diesem Zusammenhang lohnt sich eine verstärkte An-
knüpfung an Hermann Schmitz’ Konzept der „solidarischen Einleibung“.
Schlüsselwörter







L’incorporation commune et solidaire en 
tant que formes principales de la cognition sociale
Résume
Dans ce travail, je recherche les dimensions corporelles de la cognition sociale. J’affirme que 
les débats qui portent sur l’action	participative	des	sentiments et la mutuelle incorporation en 
tant que dimensions accessibles d’un point de vue phénoménologique peuvent fournir des outils 
conceptuels de grande valeur, outils relatifs aux sentiments préréflexifs qui sont corporellement 
organisés et qui donnent le sentiment d’être en relation avec un autre sujet. Je déclare, néan-
moins, que le concept de sentiment corporel de partage qui est discuté dans les débats présente 
des lacunes en regard aux récentes découvertes au sein du débat sur l’intentionnalité	collective. 
Ainsi, je propose comme alternative d’analyser le concept d’incorporation	collective chez Her-
mann Schmitz.
Mots-clés
Hermann	Schmitz,	énactivisme,	cognition	sociale,	intentionnalité	collective,	sentiment	pour	le	nous,	
dimension	corporelle
